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1. Introduction 
The spectacular revival of economic sociology in the US in the 1980s and in Europe at the 
beginning of the 21st century will be regarded as part of a paradigm shift in social sciences. 
Whereas classical sociology almost always dealt with normatively defined situations and 
value-based actions in which individual decisions, interests, and other situational aspects 
disappear from view, neo-classical economic theory focused on the rational autonomous 
individual trying to maximize private utility in market structures and therefore neglected 
social institutions as an important aspect of economic life.  
Because of this, New Institutionalism as well as New Economic Sociology claimed to 
improve sociological explanations and analyses of main economic structures by using wider 
sociological concepts and by focusing on social aspects in economic actions, especially social 
expectations. New Economic Sociology in particular focuses on social economic action and 
claims to show why and how personal interactions, networks, social norms and so on frame 
economic actions and therefore help to create market transactions as well as successful 
organizational behavior or entrepreneurship. In the 1960s and 1970s, Neil Smelser asked for, 
in a nod to Max Weber, an economic sociology which analyzes the causal relations between 
economic and social facts (Smelser, 1963). More precisely, Neil Smelser and Richard 
Swedberg define in their influential Handbook of Economic Sociology that economic sociology 
should be “the application of the frames of reference, variables, and explanatory models of 
sociology to that complex of activities which is concerned with the production, distribution, 
exchange, and consumption of scarce goods and services“ (Smelser & Swedberg, 2005: 3). 
Moreover, New Sociological Institutionalism tries to overcome the implications and 
imperfections of the sociological tradition by generally explaining institutions as a result of 
more or less rational individual action in social situations (Dimaggio, 1998; Maurer & 
Schmid, 2002). Therefore, the notion of uncertainty is widely used; only a few, more recent 
works reflect more precisely on social constellations like conflict, common interests, or 
divergent cultural patterns (Coleman, 1985; Elster, 1989; Nee, 2005; Maurer & Schmid, 2010). 
When economic sociology returned, many sociological concepts were, because of tradition, 
badly prepared for improving and systemizing analyses of the economic sphere by taking 
into account different interdependencies in economic life. Furthermore, these sociological 
theories are challenged by New Economic Institutionalism that has successfully started to 
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integrate ’social institutions’ like hierarchies, trust, social capital, etc. into the economic 
approach (see Williamson, 1985; North, 1990). Whereas the two ‘new-comers’ in sociology – 
New Institutionalism and New Economic Sociology – are still missing an integrating 
theoretical frame that would help to build up explanations that link individual actors and 
social structure in order to explain main economic phenomena or economically relevant 
phenomena like religious communities, trade unions, arts, etc. Today, there is great need for 
a linkage between assumptions on the micro level and on the macro level in order to explain 
social factors as a result of individual actions in social contexts. Hence, it is necessary to 
widen our models of economics and to show when and why social institutions matter in 
economic life and how this reproduces the social world.  
2. Theoretical foundations of economic sociology 
Today, the most important task is to bring individuals together with social structure, 
particularly in economic fields. My point of view is that this can be done by using a 
sociological approach that provides arguments about why certain social factors become 
important for individual actions in economic fields. In this way, explanatory relevance of 
social facts in the economy can be shown and explanations and analyses of economic 
phenomena can hence be improved. For me, the classical sociological concept of social 
institutions in the sense of shared social expectations is such an instrument because it claims 
that on the one hand individual actions need and sometimes create institutional framing in 
order to achieve intended structural effects; therefore the question is, under which 
circumstances such institutions come into being (see paragraph two). On the other hand, it 
can be argued that there are not only intended but also unintended economic and social 
effects. This means the main task for economic sociology would be to explain to which 
extent the particular institutions generated in the modern capitalistic economy – especially 
means-end rationality, markets, and large firms – come into being as a result of social 
processes (see paragraph three). Furthermore, economic sociology deals a lot with the 
question of why and how social institutions like trust, tradition, family networks, etc. affect 
economic life by enabling and stabilizing economic actions and relations in markets and in 
firms. New Institutionalism, on the other side, is concerned with focusing social expectations 
generally and bridging social and economic institutions by explaining how social institutions 
affect the economy and how the economy is changing social institutions. Using the notion of 
institutions firstly allows focusing on the relationship between society and economy by 
showing how social institutions matter in the economy and secondly to take the relationship 
between economy and society into account by analyzing how main economic institutions and 
processes change or stabilize social action and institutions. In doing so, economic sociology can 
be linked to New Institutionalism, and social factors enter the economic stage. This means that 
our analyses of economic and social institutions are superior to those of standard economic 
theory and functionalistic sociology by showing when social institutions matter in the 
economy and when economic factors matter in society. Concerning this, standard economic 
theory can be seen as only a special case analysis of a general social issue.  
2.1 Main challenges  
There are three main challenges for economic sociology today. Firstly, economic sociology 
needs to explain economic structures or processes by taking into account social factors, 
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especially social institutions. This responds in two ways to New Economic Sociology 
outlined in the US in the 1980s that claims in contrary to economic theory that social 
relations (social capital, trust, norms), hierarchy, and networks are important for economic 
action. Secondly, economic sociology needs to show why particular institutions come into 
being in modern economy, not only as a result of direct rational invention, but also as a 
matter of social action. Therefore, it is helpful to start with the general assumption of 
uncertainty; but in order to provide more precise explanations and analyses of main 
economic institutions, it is also important to develop and use more realistic and problem-
focused models of social action in economy. Instead, economic institutions have to be 
explained by the individual’s need for (one-sided as well as mutual) social expectations. 
This helps us to ask why and when individuals try to establish institutions and what 
problems arise in doing so. Furthermore, this provides a criterion for the extent to which 
particular institutions help to frame individual actions as well as social relations in the 
economic field by supporting exchange, defining prices or markets, legitimating 
organizational structures, etc. Summarizing, economic sociology on the one hand should 
explain why and how particular economic institutions or institutional settings like markets, 
large firms, money, etc. come into being and are maintained by individuals in economic fields 
(North, 1977; Trigilia, 2002). On the other hand, sociological (institution) theories need to show 
how economic actions reproduce general social institutions like rationality, time, common 
knowledge, patterns of legitimation, organizational forms, etc. (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991; 
Dimaggio, 1994; Fligstein, 2005; Nee, 2005). Analyses of social as well as economic institutions 
in the economic field are more relevant to economic-sociology. Whereas analyses of how 
economic action influences social institutions like cultural symbols and rituals are more 
important to New Sociological Institutionalism. But both come together within an approach 
that tries to link individual actions and social structures by explaining and analyzing social 
institutions in the sense of social expectations that support social actions in economy.  
Last but not least, to prevent the failures of both neo-classical economics and classical 
sociology and for adopting the claim of economic sociology to focus on social factors in 
economic life, to me, the most important aspect is to firstly look upon social situations with 
regard to the individuals, so we can see why particular social factors become relevant; and 
then with regard to the social side-effects that are – intendedly and unintendedly – 
produced. Economic sociology needs a theoretical framework or foundation that gives good 
methodological arguments for connecting individual actions and structure. The notion of 
social institutions in the broader sense of shared social expectations provides such a linkage. 
Today, multi-level explanations that have improved and become more common since the 
1980s provide an elaborate methodological framework for bridging individual actions, 
social institutions, and structure. The general aim is to provide a theoretical-oriented way of 
bridging micro and macro theories and therefore connect both levels of analyses in all social 
sciences (Coleman, 1986; Alexander et al., 1987). Hence, I will argue that multi-level 
explanations are a useful method for economic sociology as well because it needs to be 
founded on an action theory that provides a connection between individuals and social 
structure by showing why certain social aspects become relevant for individuals in their 
social, political, and economic actions. The common issue is that the linkage is founded on 
the assumption of intentional individuals that scan their social world as an action frame. 
That means that social institutions as well as cultural beliefs or scarce material resources are 
relevant for economic action in general (Maurer & Schmid, 2010).  
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2.2 Max Weber’s notion of “society and economy” 
In his work, Weber puts economic action and economic institutions center-stage. To him: 
“(modern, A.M.) ’economic action’ is any peaceful exercise of an actor’s control over 
resources which is in its main impulse oriented toward economic ends” (Weber, 1978: 63).1 
According to Weber, economic action in modern economy is thus defined as means-end 
oriented action in order to produce, consume, or distribute scarce goods and services. In 
Weberian sociology, it is most important to show what specific forms of production, 
consumption, or distribution are generated by this kind of action in modern societies and, 
secondly, by which social-cultural background they are caused. Especially the over-
whelming rationalization of individual actions and economic structure is given priority in 
those analyses. Weber’s notion of the mutual relation of “economy and society” is that they 
are strongly interrelated. For example, different processes of rationalization work on the 
level of cultural ideas (see for example the rational system of Protestant ideas), individual 
behavior (especially a systematic way of life and work), and social and economic institutions 
(authority systems, markets, firms, money, bookkeeping, etc.) work together when the 
modern rational capitalism comes into being (Weber, 1946; Weber, 1978). According to 
Weber, widespread rational institutions in economy like hierarchical organizations, 
especially large firms as well as large markets for consumer goods or money (Weber, 1978: 
chapter 2; Weber, 2000), are the result of the entanglement of a cultural belief system (that of 
Protestant sects) and the institutionalization of certain action patterns (that of systematic 
working and living) and specific social structures (primarily a rational state and a rational 
public administration). The main thesis states that through institutionalization the 
individual level and the macro level become interlinked, and different processes of 
rationalization are enforced. 
2.2.1 Economic action, institutions, and structures 
In my opinion, economic sociology can learn a lot by critically assessing the notion of 
economic action and institutions outlined by Max Weber – whose rich work has not been 
fully explored yet (Swedberg, 2003a; Maurer, 2010). Weber is still important for economic 
sociology for two reasons: firstly, because his methodological premise is to start explaining 
social regularities from an individual point of view focusing on the institutionalized social 
setting; secondly, because of his well-known historical view, especially that on the 
overwhelming processes of rationalization in the modern western world in general and that 
of rational economic actions, institutions, and structures in particular. Weber focused on the 
need for and existence of institutions in the sense of socially shared expectations with regard 
to the individual’s need for orientation in a complex social world. Connected with this, he 
especially highlighted their reflection on ends as well as on means-end relations. Weber 
assumed that mankind is able to act intentionally, but that real action is mostly a mixture of 
rational intentions as well as of traditional and emotional actions. But in order to provide 
explanations, it is best to start with the assumption of means-end oriented actions and 
reconstruct them in accordance to social evidence. Only if such an explanation fails, social 
scientists should assume value rationality, traditions, or affect as situational motivation; this 
is what Weber did in the “Protestant ethic” where he used the assumption of value-
                                                                 
1 "Wirtschaftlich orientiert soll ein Handeln insoweit heißen, als es seinem gemeinten Sinn nach an der 
Fürsorge für einen Begehr an Nutzleistungen orientiert ist.“ (Weber, 1985: 31) 
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rationality and an ethically framed situation in order to explain the typical actions by 
members of Protestant sects. Therefore, Weber explained the overcoming of traditional 
economy by modern rational capitalism mainly as a result of value-oriented individual 
actions in a specific institutional setting. 
Modern economic institutions and structural elements can therefore be regarded as much as 
a topic for sociologists as for economists because of their social foundations in specific 
religious ideas.  
However, in his work, Max Weber primarily addresses the problem of social order explored 
as general need for social expectations when individuals act with regard to one another and 
try to realize certain intentions. As is known, Max Weber claimed to start sociological 
explanations by focusing on individuals and their reflected and rational intentions 
(Swedberg, 1998; Norkus, 2001). This is where the social context comes in – both as a 
restriction structure as well as an opportunity structure. Following Weber, the most 
important aspect of the social world is the existence of socially related individuals. That is 
why he asked how individuals are able to build up stable social relationships in a complex 
social world. Because of the complexity of the world and the various motives of 
individuals, social actions and social relationships need to be grounded in reasonable 
social expectations.  
According to Weber, such social expectations get an objective chance only if they are framed 
by general rules – not only by interests or habits – that are acknowledged as legitimate by 
the individuals. In that case, there is a reasonable chance that everybody will orientate on 
them and can normally expect others to do the same.  
General rules or a social order become legitimate because of three ideal-type beliefs. Firstly, 
legitimacy can occur due to a belief in the formal correctness of an order or of the process of 
defining it. Secondly, it can occur due to the belief in the sanctity of tradition. Thirdly, it can 
occur due to the belief in the extraordinary skills of the ruler (Weber, 1985: 124 ff). What is 
important to see is that Weber did not explain the objective chance with direct reference to 
individual interests, although it is assumed that a legitimate order responds to general 
interests. A very important point for Weber is that a legitimate end-oriented order, 
especially when guaranteed by bureaucratic staff, enables groups of individuals to act in a 
coordinated manner, and moreover, to build up stable organizations in social, political, and 
economic surroundings that allow an ongoing, rational coordination of actions.  
The assumption of a collective principle of legitimacy implies that the ruled ones as much as 
the staff “normally” follow the order without reference to concrete individual interests or  
social interdependencies. In fact, this only allows us to interpret formal organizations like 
businesses as a formal institution providing coordination in every field and offering only 
positive results, that means they are seen free of negative or unintended by-products.  
The well-known thesis of Max Weber that bureaucratic organizations like the modern 
business firm are the most rational form of coordination and therefore unavoidable in 
modern life is due to the assumption of a given collective validation. Ignoring organizations’ 
tendency of threatening individual interests, Weber also did not examine problems of 
functioning and maintaining hierarchical institutions either in social or economic fields.  
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2.2.2 The spirit of Protestant ethic: The cultural foundation of modern capitalism 
Weber’s religious studies of ascetic Protestantism can be seen as an adaptation of the general 
argument of an overall rationalization of ideas and institutions. In particular, The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber, 1958) can be interpreted as an institution analysis.  
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber concretely shows that some 
Protestant sects believe that they cannot be sure to be elected by God, so they follow the 
rational rules set by ascetic Protestantism in order to find signs of God’s blessing in the real 
world. In other words, Weber explained the behavior of a specific group of actors in a 
specific historical situation by elaborating the normative power of the Protestant ethic.  
While a group of people follows the systematic, rational, and world-oriented rules of 
Protestantism, typical patterns of behavior can be deduced. More precisely, Weber outlined 
that:  
• a systematic way of life, 
• systematic work behavior (calling), 
• and especially a very good feeling by profit maximization,  
created powerful social institutions that changed former traditional behavior in economic 
life.  
Regarding Weber’s argument within a framework of multi-level explanations, 
differentiating assumptions on the individual and the macro-level, he explains patterns of 
actions for a group of people with regard to individual intentions (both interests and values) 
that can be read in the mirror of socially defined principles. The underlying explanatory 
strategy firstly implies that, because of the institutionalized frame patterns of actions arise 
and gain structural effects and secondly unintended consequences due to social 
interdependencies as a matter of various kinds of social relationships are neglected.  
Therefore, rational structures and elements of modern capitalism – big business firms, 
rational organizations, rational calculation, and the systematic profit-maximization – are 
explained as the result of the actions of Protestants or, more general, of collective ideas.  
However, Weber also argued that once established and successful in everyday economic 
life, these institutions are self-stabilizing and have no more need of their former basis, the 
religious background.  
Whereas the institutionalization of rationalized and economically relevant patterns of 
behavior is explained due to individual interests, their functioning and maintaining is not. It 
seems as though Weber described the functions and maintenance of institutions once 
established without any regard to individual interests and social interdependencies, for 
example reactions from non-Protestants.  
2.2.3 Some critical remarks on Weber 
Let me sum up what we have seen and what we are missing. First of all, it can be said that 
Weber focused on the need for institutions by regarding the individuals’ intentional acting in 
a complex world and taking others into account. But the validity of social institutions is 
explained by given principles of legitimacy or a given religious ethic. In both cases, the 
www.intechopen.com
 
Economic Sociology: Bringing Back Social Factors 83 
institutionalized social expectations are founded in collective ideas overlapping individual 
interests and other social constellations. We have to state that Weber’s model of social or 
economic relations depends on an underlying framing of individual interests by collectively 
stated general rules. This is part of Weber’s suggestion to work on the basis of a typology of 
action and the empirical evidence of motives. Concerning the Protestants, Weber argued 
that their main concern was to obtain “certainty of salvation”, and the “Protestant ethic” 
was their means to gain it. But Weber has no general argument as to why individuals 
orientate themselves on normative rules, whether means-end oriented, according to 
tradition, or through affects.  
Secondly, the reconstruction shows that he used a very simple argument for transforming 
individual actions via institutionalized action patterns into structural effects: He deduced 
the macro-effects directly from the institutionalized patterns without any regard to social 
interdependencies. Because almost all Protestants save money, work in a systematic way, 
and maximize their profits, large firms producing for markets as well as an overall 
rationalization come into being. 
Last but not least, we can see that institutions only matter if they are founded by collective 
ideas and show what is right or wrong in everyday behavior. In this case, institutions 
provide orientation for individuals. In particular, institutions, which are founded by a legal 
order and guaranteed by officials, are regarded as essential for rational, modern economies 
because according to Weber, they are the basis of rationally coordinated actions. This 
includes the modern business firm as well as political parties or even the national state. 
Thus, it becomes clear that Weber is mainly interested in discussing how stable expectations 
are constructed and enforced generally. 
2.3 Institutions in action-based, multi-level explanations 
The missing links in Weber’s argumentation can be defined more precisely within the 
framework of an action-based, multi-level model of explanation based upon an action 
theory. The claim is to connect assumptions on the individual level with those of the macro 
level in order to explain social phenomena with regard to both. Secondly, it is stated that the 
assumptions on both levels should be enriched in order to provide more realistic 
explanations. Thirdly, there is a strong effort to improve and integrate our knowledge or 
theories about social reality; therefore, one action theory is proposed to be used as the 
foundation in order to build up a set of situation models that help to strengthen social 
factors in sociological explanations. My suggestion is to build up situational models 
centered on problems of social actions that make social expectations advantageous in 
general; this means that the underlying general assumption states individual intentionality. 
Within this approach, the underlying social problem as well as therefore relevant individual 
capabilities can be highlighted, thus increasing the necessity as well as the difficulty of 
solving the problem by finding (the most) appropriate institutional setting(s). This 
sociological perspective then focuses on the difficulties of establishing a ’good’ institutional 
system with regard to particular social problems that individuals have to solve when living 
together as well as on the side effects that come along with this. That means that specific 
institutions as well as complex institutional settings, like that of markets, firms, or modern 
western capitalism are to be regarded as the result of both structure and action with regard 
to a concrete historical context. 
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Institutions are to be explained as a result of intentional actions in specific social situations 
in order to create social expectations and therefore help to stabilize ‘good’ social relations or 
orders. In the next step, institutions can also be regarded as a social situational factor which 
frames individual actions and leads to particular – intended as well as unintended –
 structural effects like “the spirit of Capitalism”, revolutionary movements, stratification of 
resources, etc. Therefore, we need a model that illustrates how institutions work. According 
to the arguments given above, it should be possible to answer the question of the 
construction, the stabilization, and the change of institutions by intentionally acting 
individuals.  
1. It is mostly suggested to use an action theory, which assumes that all individuals act on 
the basis of intentions, and to combine this assumption with models of social situations. 
Such sociological situation models should predominantly focus on social 
interdependencies in order to point out how social factors become relevant in economy 
(see Weber, 1978, chapter 1). The main variable of the action theory should pick up 
relevant aspects of the situation and should provide an argument as to how a certain 
factor influences the actions of an individual (for example, by stating that individuals 
need orientation and therefore scan situations for helpful and relevant information like 
traditions, cultural symbols, pure information, etc.). 
2. At the very core of the argument a description of the underlying social situation is to be 
found: e.g., a type of social interdependency, power relations, market structures, etc. 
Only with regard to a social situation, it is possible to say what concrete intentions are 
working, and moreover, what the possible actions are. For example, if one started with 
a situational description that focuses on ‘bad governance’ from the viewpoint of 
individuals trying to realize a “good life”, it can generally be stated that there are three 
types of actions: a) to keep quiet (loyalty or resignation), b) to raise one’s voice, c) to 
leave (exit) the system (see for example Hirschman, 1970; Lindenberg, 1989). So it is 
highly recommended to start with a simple action theory, for example, the assumptions 
that individuals act in regard to (private) interests and by being able to evaluate the 
results of actions and situations in response to their intentions, because then it is 
possible to explain, in which situations individuals act in which way. But this action 
theory should also be broadened by taking into account common interests or belief 
systems as intentions or by specifying the individual’s capacity to interpret situations in 
the light of private or public interests as well as shared cultural belief systems (North, 
1977; Schelling, 1978; Coleman, 1990; Lindenberg, 1994). 
3. As mentioned above, a theory of rational action uses a general selection rule by stating 
that rational individuals choose the action providing the best or at least adequate result 
in accordance to social structure and the concrete intentions (for example consumer 
utility, value orientation, minimizing fear, etc.). Only this allows us to explain the 
typically chosen action in a particular social setting. 
4. The great challenge is the third step, in which the explained individual actions need to 
be transformed into collective effects, such as market or organizational structures. If we 
use the notion of institutions, at this point, we are also able to state the validity or 
changing of particular institutions. Such transformations can be achieved on the basis of 
formal rules (selection rules, simulations), by pure aggregation (as it is done in Weber’s 
Protestantism thesis), with response to institution theories, social mechanisms, etc. (for 
an overview, see Coleman, 1990; Maurer & Schmid, 2010, chapter 3). 
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The sociological perspective results from explaining institutions by reviewing social 
constellations (or more general, social situations) from an individual point of view as a 
problem of expectation. The guideline for building up institutional analyses is to make 
assumptions about how the individual figures out problematic constellations that make 
particular social institutions or institutional settings helpful.  
By using the concept of institutionally differently defined situations combined with the 
same assumption on the micro level, it is also possible to explain which intended and 
unintended social structures will arise due to specific institutions and individuals. 
Subsequently, the main effort is to show how institutions work and thus reproduce social 
situations like social constellations, market structures, etc. Mainly, social situations that are 
defined by complementary interests should be taken into account by economic sociology because 
they provide typically good reasons for economic actions when exchange is possible (Weber, 
1978, chapter 2). As New Economic Sociologists assumes, economic exchange mostly needs 
certain institutions, especially when markets do not work.2 However, the perspective can be 
broadened by taking into account not only the exchange of private consumer goods, but also 
that of social or public goods because then not only markets but also hierarchies, cultural 
belief systems, or social networks come to the fore. Consequently, economic sociology needs 
to analyze not only markets but also networks, hierarchical organizations, or cultural beliefs 
as an institutional setting that may frame economic actions, but is mostly defined in social 
contexts. This means we need to look closer at the conditions that may help to run them. In 
order to do so, situational models should focus on cultural beliefs as well as on social 
relationships (authority, friendship, family, etc.) and explain how they are combined with 
problems of social action in the economic sphere.  
The heuristic of an action-based explanation for economic sociology and institution theories 
lies in ascertaining social interdependencies that make specific mutual expectations 
advantageous for individuals. In response to general types of social interdependency or 
problems of social acting the need for social institutions is shown for social as well as 
economic life. In my opinion, the most exciting problem for economic sociology is the need 
for social expectations when producing and trading goods and services. We can generally 
call this the trust problem. In other words, in contrast to the assumption of neo-classical 
economics, it is assumed that voluntary transactions need credible commitments when 
markets fail. In contrast to the general, classical focus on ‘complexity’, I suggest giving 
precise arguments about when and why social expectations are useful and therefore helpful 
for individuals in economic life, and to explain the consequences they might have. In doing 
so, it can be shown that the general problem focused on by Weber can be described more 
precisely by looking at least at three types of social interdependencies focusing on interest 
constellations. This leads us to analyses that feature more realistic and precise theses about 
what kind of institution could help, what institution can be constructed given certain 
situational and individual aspects, and, last but not least, what kind of social effects may 
arise.  
                                                                 
2 Therefore, it is helpful to start with the assumption that individuals try to realize their intentions that 
are mostly defined by the need for consumer goods in the economic sphere, but can also be defined by 
the need for social reputation (Smith, 1950), or by a general “ideal” orientation on what needs are 
important and what means are therefore adequate (Weber, 1946, chapter 1; Weber, 1978). 
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This can be seen as a starting point for an integrated approach that focuses and systemizes 
social situations which, in the sense of social expectations, make institutions advantageous 
for individual actors, but also looks for their intended and unintended consequences.  
3. Social institutions in modern economy  
Therefore, I am arguing now on the basis of a theory of intentional actions that is more 
precise, in the sense that realistic theses can be formulated about the conditions as well as 
the functioning of main economic institutions in modern societies, when we do not start 
with the assumption of given or socially founded expectations on the macro level. Instead, I 
suggest starting with simple assumptions about individuals trying to act with regard to 
their own intentions in social fields and therefore dealing with the problem of social 
expectation. Hence, we consider the processes of establishing and maintaining institutions 
in economic fields by regarding individual intentions as well as capabilities on the one hand, 
and by taking specific social constellations into account on the other. 
3.1 Why institutions matter 
We can now argue that institutions matter in economic life when individuals need social 
expectations to solve specific problems like that of defining ‘ends’ or ‘goods’ in economy 
(that I am referring to as the problem of orientation), getting information about the situation 
that lies ahead, especially who are the exchange partners and what are the exchange rates 
(this may be called the problem of coordination), and lastly, the big questions as to whether 
there are any common interests and how to meet them, such as the wealth of a society, 
justice, social order, etc.  
Within the framework of action-based institution theories we can use these three kinds of 
social problems, but also develop more precisely shaped models of social action in economy 
that has need for institutions in general. This also allows us to focus on the underlying 
problem in a more concise way by stating why and how particular aspects of the situation 
and of individual action become relevant. Hence, it is possible to define a wide range of 
social action problems that matter in the economic field by giving precise arguments about 
the underlying logic and the degree of the problem that has to be overcome in order to 
found social action and relations in the economic sphere.  
If we start with the very simple assumption that individuals act in order to meet private 
interests, we can argue that with regard to the three logics of interdependency described 
above the general need for orientation is not that problematic, since every orientation is 
better than none. Because of this, simple common knowledge as well as cultural symbols or 
defined social standards or information by chance can help to act intentionally. In all of 
these cases, ‘focal points’ help by saying what action is to be expected. Furthermore, because 
of their positive effects, such patterns of orientation are stabilizing step by step and therefore 
create path-depending social solutions that are not problematic or further discussed. That is 
what Neo-Institutionalists have in mind when arguing that processes of institutionalization 
happen and create social expectations without anyone noticing.  
If we start with complementary interests it is to argue that, in the easiest case, two or more 
actors only need to know what the other will do in order to act intentional. This case is 
described for example by Thomas Schelling as a pure coordination game of ‘strangers’ who 
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are to meet in New York but have not made arrangements as to where and when. Then 
simple common knowledge can help and can build up to institutions by used private or 
common knowledge; for example to meet at the most famous place in town and the usual 
time. 
The challenge for economic sociology is to figure out situations that make social interaction 
or exchange useful for individuals, but cause the need for stable mutual institutions at the 
same time. Thus, by analyzing the structure of interests we can describe the problem and 
ask what sort of institution might be necessary and possible. If formal institutions 
guaranteed by hierarchies are to be explained, we can say that unintended by-products are 
to be expected caused by the conflicting interest structure between rulers and staff as well as 
between rulers and obedients.   
But this is not the overall case when focusing on coordination problems – most important in 
modern economic life – because successful social coordination benefits from complementary 
interests and therefore needs only to restrict the individual’s scope of action in order to gain 
the positive effects of specializing, labor division, or agency. Coordination is a general 
problem in modern societies and economies because of the socially guaranteed rights of 
individuals to act and the formally defined property rights (including the formal right to 
enter into a contract, e.g. a market or an employer-employee relationship). Ergo, we can 
consider the problems that come along with such social relations and look for adequate 
social institutions that help to stabilize them, causing intended as well as unintended social 
and economic effects. In this framework, the often mentioned general trust problem can 
now be considered more precisely either as a problem of one-spot exchange by strangers or 
as a long-term exchange within a group that shares social norms or as a long-term exchange 
within a conflict arena and therefore making opportunism and strategic action relevant. To 
shape typical coordination problems in the economic sphere, it is helpful to consider firstly 
situational aspects and add special individuals’ skills (to strengthen coordination problems, 
it is helpful to reflect which capabilities would help but are missing, e.g. to have the right 
information, to have complete information, to have and reflect ends logically, and, most of 
all, to act rationally with regard to intentions or ends like consumer utility, profit, common 
interests, and so on). Coordination problems are essential in modern economic life because 
both market exchange as well as employer-employee relationships can be regarded as a 
general problem of coordination, but with a specific logic (see paragraph 3.2 and 3.3). 
Whereas market exchange is mostly driven by trust problems that result from incomplete 
information (about the others, e.g. either private consumers, firms, the state, or, above all, 
about the commodities), social relations within business firms are a kind of trust problem 
that goes along with employees acting on behalf of their employers and their employers’ 
interests. It is not so much the exchange of goods and services that makes intra-firm 
relations problematic, but the wide range of conflict patterns like opportunism, agency 
problems, strategic action, etc. Therefore, it can be stated that such social institutions are 
advantageous that firstly solve the coordination problem and secondly help to frame the 
conflict structure. Privately-owned firms in modern economies can be viewed as an 
institutionalized answer to the problem of controlling and determining the actions of others. 
Business firms have to be explained by analyzing the incentives given in and by hierarchical 
structures. 
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In contrast to economic theory that focuses mainly on exchange and complementary 
interests, sociology and political theory normally focus on common interests and therefore 
coordinated collective behavior. The classic answer to this is given by Max Weber (see 
paragraph 2) who argued that a means-end and legally founded order creates an 
organization (“Verband”) that provides rational collective action in all fields. But Weber’s 
solution is based on the assumption of a given legitimacy (“Anerkennung”) and is lacking 
an explanation on how this can be constituted as well as on how collective action in 
economic fields can be organized by alternative mechanisms when legitimacy fails. Whereas 
sociologists take common interests seriously when discussing collective actions, they do not 
ask for the corresponding problems that might be caused by individual interests. This is 
because they argue like Weber or assume that common interests enforce collective actions 
themselves. One of the major insights of using a rational-choice theory is that common 
interests do not automatically lead to collective actions, but also need social institutions to 
be guaranteed. This means we need to ask when and why intentional actors are able to 
create social institutions that allow them to solve the various problems that go along with 
collective action, first of all the various kinds of free-riding, but also problems of defining 
ends (Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980; Wiesenthal, 1993). Because free-riding is a dominant strategy 
when common interests are enforced by others, such expectations need to be enforced either 
inside the group by social mechanisms or by establishing authority and control structures – 
all of which are also public goods. Economic sociology can use and broaden the concept of 
public goods to discuss why producer or consumer associations are so rarely to be found in 
modern economies or what social institutions are possible and necessary to establish and 
maintain such associations. An economically interesting variation of this general problem is 
discussed by Russell Hardin and Elinor Ostrom as ‘Tragedy of Commons’. Ostrom (1990) in 
particular showed that the economic use of scarce common goods like water or fish can be 
governed within small groups and informal trust-based rules and local knowledge.  
3.2 The two main economic institutions from the sociological perspective 
Institutions and their general functioning might be more important for New Institutionalism 
and sociological theory than for economic sociology. This general statement has now to be 
specified with the argument that economic sociology has to deal more with coordination 
problems and therefore with market institutions and enterprises or labor institutions, but 
needs also to take into account the economic effects of social standards, rules, norms, 
cultural knowledge, symbols, rituals, etc.  
While economic sociology is more interested in the various forms and functions of the two 
main institutions in modern economies – markets and firms – it must not neglect the 
problems of collective action as part of modern economies (e.g. trade unions, consumer 
groups, pressure groups, European Union, WHO, etc.), nor the need for fundamental social 
institutions like concepts of rationality or time and how they are used in economic actions. 
Whereas coordination problems referring to exchange can be solved by market institutions 
(market prices and competition) and hierarchies, and are stabilized by social institutions 
mainly when markets fail or hierarchies and control doesn’t work, cooperation problems 
referring to cooperative work normally need to be solved by hierarchies.  
In the following, I am going to show how to deal with the two main institutions of modern 
economies in sociology with regard to new developments in social theory. The main point is 
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to consider the existence of these institutions on the basis of problems of orientation, 
coordination, and cooperation. 
3.2.1 The large firm 
From an institutional point of view there are three perspectives on the business firm 
described as a privately-owned organization producing for an anonymous market in order 
to make profit. The first question is: Why has that kind of organizational form spread so 
widely since the late 19th century? Secondly: What kind of social actions and interdependencies 
are typical for this social setting, causing what kind of social institutions? Thirdly: How can 
we describe the relationship between modern society and (large) business firms in terms of social 
action and social expectations? 
a. Why privately-owned and hierarchically organized (large) business firms 
The first question is well considered because of the inevitable decline of social communities 
(tribes, families, feudal tenures, cloisters, and guilds) as producers of scarce goods and 
services during the process of industrialization. Instead, centralized production in the 
privately-owned industry driven by pure profit-orientation increased and became the very 
core issue of all social sciences (Swedberg, 2003). Whereas economists and historians point 
out that the decline of social communities and the rise of privately-owned companies was 
mostly related to technical innovations, (Neo-)Marxists as well as New-Institutionalists 
focus on the ‘transformation problem’ of human labor that arises because of the two main 
structural elements: private property and profit-orientation. The problem is to transform the 
abilities of human labor into an outcome that benefits the few owners and therefore 
coordinates the working process and solves the agency problem by effective structures. This 
is the very starting point for discussing the possibility as well as the need for centralized 
control mechanisms by private owners within the firm as an important fact for the overall 
success of privately-owned firms. Furthermore it is argued that the profit-orientation drives 
the widening of coordination effects firstly by enlarging the business and secondly by 
finding more and more rational ways of coordinating a large number of skilled workers. 
Economists and historians showed that social coordination effects the process of establishing 
more complex organizational and managerial structures, as well as organizing the 
production on a large scale and scope (Chandler, 1962; Williamson, 1985; North, 1990).  
b. Social expectations within firms 
Therefore, the formal organizational structures as well as the formation of managerial 
structures gained a lot of attention during the 20th century. One of the most exciting aspects 
discussed within sociology – especially in the sociology of work – relates to the change of 
control systems. It is stated that direct and personal forms of control lost relevance and were 
substituted by more technical and bureaucratic forms of control (Edwards, 1979) and lastly 
by new forms of self-control (Burawoy, 1979; Piore & Sabel, 1984). With this reading, 
sociology competes with New Economic Institutionalism that offers a strong argument for 
the rise of various kinds of managerial and structural forms in the 1930s in the US and in the 
1950s in Europe because of information overload on the top management, which generated 
a need for certain kinds of institutions or for organizational change. Managers as well as 
hierarchies within this framework are regarded as effective mechanisms of coordination 
established by the private owners.  
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In contrast, sociological institution theories in the tradition of Weber state that 
organizational and managerial structures are part of collective ideas and therefore need to 
be regarded as an expression of legitimacy and not so much as a mechanism to ensure 
coordination effects (Dimaggio & Powell, 1991).  
Located somewhere in between, conflict theories argue that especially ‘labor institutions’ 
(working hours, trade unions, state policy, or international institution systems like the EU) 
came into being in order to modify the conflict between workers and business owners 
(shareholders as well as entrepreneurs) (see Fligstein, 2005). The existence of labor 
institutions in general as well as that of different kinds of labor institutions is interpreted as 
part of the ongoing process of framing conflicts by using social institutions in a way that 
keeps the process running.  
Most social scientists analyze business firms as a social (action) system that comes into being 
when formally free actors sell their ‘rights’ to those that pay them. From the viewpoint of 
the former actors, the so-called agents, they need to bargain for their ‘earnings’ and to make 
sure that they are able to get their sold rights back if they want to or to voice when their 
rights are hurt. The latter actors, the principals, need expectations about the agents: their 
abilities, their motivations and their real actions. To enforce such expectations, additional 
guarantees are helpful – primarily hierarchical control, loan systems, and, sometimes, social 
norms (Coleman, 1990). Because of the interest structure, such institutions are not to be 
regarded as a convention, but need to be explained as a coordination system enforcing 
control and regulating conflicts. Institutions that are engaged and maintained by self-
interested principles mostly have the unintended by-product to hire officials and set up 
hierarchical structures, which tend to meet their own authority interests at the cost of 
everyone by building up power monopolies, consuming resources, etc. Another very special 
adaptation of this situation is provided in the work of Oliver Williamson (1985). He 
discusses the problem that exchange relations often have costs because the underlying 
contracts cannot specify all details. Especially when asset specifity works, one partner has to 
invest specifically in the exchange relation, so social expectations can help to run exchange 
and therefore improve efficiency. Because of the explored control problem, that is an explicit 
form of a trust problem, formal and hierarchical institutions are needed but must be 
regarded as the source of further institutions. For example, managers in large companies 
who have the task of controlling the workers as well as the finances cause further control 
problems, but at a much higher level, because of their authority and power.  
The hot topic within economic sociology is to show how this process is embedded in social 
constellations, so institutions are not only regarded in terms of coordination effects, but also 
in terms of underlying power relations as well as previously defined formal social rights 
and informal social ideas. While industrial sociology and sociology of work mainly focus on 
the conflict problem from a power perspective by overseeing the coordination problem, 
most organization and institution theories (as well as economics) focus on the primary 
coordination problem, missing the conflict structure and, most of all, the underlying power 
relations. The heuristic for economic sociology is to regard both processes: the coordination 
effects as well as the conflict structure that goes along with privately-owned firms and 
makes power, not effectiveness alone, relevant for analyzing internal structures and 
processes.   
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c. Social expectations concerning firms 
The new argument within an institutional frame is to regard business firms as an actor 
within society. This means firms act not only as economic actors in markets, but also as 
social actors in social contexts. According to this, we can show that there are different 
constellations that make societies address social expectations to firms. Consequently, the 
general focus is to regard firms as part of economic expectations (mostly addressed within 
markets), formal expectations (mostly addressed by national states and increasingly by 
international regimes like the EU, WTO, etc.), and also of social expectations (special 
cultural ideas, norms, principles, etc.). To do so, I suggest not asking how social expectations 
work in general, but more precisely what constellations make them relevant and what is the 
logic of the problem behind them. Therefore, with regard to the concept developed above, it 
is helpful to differentiate the underlying problem and also to consider how it is reflected and 
defined within a society as a whole or by different groups, respectively. It is important to see 
that firms in modern society are mainly addressed by the social expectation to provide 
goods and services that are ‘demanded’, and this is considered to be best done within 
market competition and individually orientated on market prices that create profit.  
In this sense, we can firstly state that social expectations become important when markets 
fail in motivating as well as in coordinating firms. Then social expectations like collective 
decisions, cultural ideas, etc., can define goods, consumers, and exchange relations. 
Secondly, social mechanisms like networks, social capital, hierarchy, formal rules, laws, 
norms, etc. can help to modify negative economic effects caused by private firms like 
pollution, antitrust, bubbles, etc. In general, firms are to be seen as societal actors that 
influence not only economy but also social relations and, most of all, social institutions. That 
requires to analyze how society can enforce such actions that go along with social ideas and 
norms, e.g. diversity management, corporate social responsibility, philanthropism, etc. As the 
most problematic and important case we can now consider the actions of firms that exploit 
social institutions when making use of them, such as temporal rhythms, social relations, social 
trust, democratic ideas, etc. Then the task will be to analyze how society or social groups can 
resist and try to reproduce their mechanisms of social integration, especially by means of social 
institutions that enable individuals to cooperate in order to criticize and sanction powerful 
economic actors such as trusts, investment banks, stock exchanges, etc. 
3.2.2 Markets 
Most classic economics discuss mankind’s necessity to organize their survival by producing 
scarce goods and services (e.g. Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Max Weber, etc.). Sociology focuses 
not so much on technical but more on the social aspects of economic action and regards 
economy as socially organized. Therefore, various ways of organizing economy can be 
differentiated within the framework of institutionalism, what means that economy is to be 
described as a typical institutional setting – consisting of specific institutions with different 
functions and effects – with a specific relationship to society. One of the most famous 
typology states at least four major forms of society-economy relations: 1) the historic build-
up on slavery and on ethics based on the ‘good life’, 2) the feudal system with a substantial 
production in private households and cloisters framed by overall feudal relations, 3) 
traditional capitalism founded on traditional habits and structures in guilds and trades, 4) 
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modern capitalism with private firms producing and selling in free markets in order to 
make profit. In the modern western capitalist society, economy works mostly on its own 
principles and by using information provided by free markets (especially prices).   
a. Why markets 
In the last decades, sociologists have learnt a lot about markets through ethnologists, 
anthropologists and historians.  
Beginning with the famous work by Malinowski, we can state that mankind has always had 
to earn their living by producing and trading, but in pre-modern times had to do it within a 
social framework that guaranteed the survival for most at a very low level (Polanyi, 1996). 
Exchange involved not only material goods but also women, children, symbols, etc. and was 
strongly restricted by spatial, temporal, and social norms. Markets existed but were socially 
embedded and to a high degree culturally defined as shown in the descriptions of the “Kula 
Ring” by Malinowski, “Kaffirs” by Karl Polanyi, the “Bazaar Economy” by Clifford Geertz, or 
the “Agora in Athens” by Richard Swedberg (see for example Polanyi, 1996; Swedberg, 2003b).  
As we know today, a social reason for exchange and for establishing markets was the social 
rule not to trade within one’s own tribe, community, or ethnicity (Weber, 1981). The very 
simple form of exchange needs neither markets nor money, but with growing specialization 
and division of labor, exchange relations were more and more ‘organized’ within markets 
and by means of payment. Karl Polanyi (1996) posits that markets became free from their 
social embeddedness when the labor force as well as most goods were traded and priced 
solely through markets.  
With the process of broadening, large private-firms markets gained increasing importance 
by the mid-19th century. ”A chain-reaction was started – what before was merely isolated 
markets was transmuted into a self-regulation system of markets ... The crucial step was 
this: labour and land were made into commodities, that is, they were treated as if produced 
for sale ... Accordingly, there was a market price for the use of labor power, called wages, 
and a market price for the use of land, called rent” (Polanyi, 1996: 147). Furthermore, 
markets as well as firms were no longer a part of society, and production as well as prices 
were no longer set by law, custom, ethics, or rulers, but by formally free market transactions 
based on contracts. “In this way an ‘economic sphere’ came into existence that was sharply 
delimited from other institutions in society. Since no human aggregation can survive without a 
functioning productive apparatus, its embodiment in a distinct and separate sphere had the 
effect of making the ‘rest’ of society dependent upon that sphere”(Polanyi, 1996: 148).3 
What seems most important for economic sociology is what Adam Smith described as the 
very idea of market competition that is able to motivate individuals’ exchange and to 
coordinate exchange relations within a group of strangers – or at least no longer socially and 
morally integrated individuals – so that the available resources are used in the most efficient 
way (Smith, 1950). Market coordination – based on prize building and competition – is to be 
seen as “best practice” of organizing the production in modern society. In a similar way, 
Max Weber stated that customers and entrepreneurs increasingly lost their traditional habits 
and started to act rationally in the sense of orientating themselves on market prices and 
competition rather than on traditional habits. In doing so, markets are of great help for 
                                                                 
3 For critical remarks see (North, 1977). 
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entrepreneurs because market prices allow them to calculate how high the costs for labor, 
land, and machines are and therefore, how much they need to produce and at what prices 
the commodities have to be sold in order to make profit. Instead of material rationality, 
means-end rationality in the sense of profit maximization has become more common in 
economy and society, and finds the necessary institutional setting within mass markets for 
goods as well as labor (Weber, 1978; Weber, 2000). In the last century, the major tendencies 
of the enlargement of markets or market relations within societies resulted in a decline of 
social-relation patterns and boosted the globalization of markets themselves, especially of 
the financial markets (for a very short introduction, see Carruthers, 1996; Swedberg, 2003b; 
Stearns & Mizruchi, 2005). Due to globalization, the production system as well as the 
societal wealth depend increasingly on financial markets4 as the crises in the 1930s and at 
the beginning of the 21st century illustrate (Mackenzie & Millo, 2003).  
b. Social expectations within markets 
The very core of New Economic Sociology are markets. This is due to the description of 
markets as an ideal model by neoclassical economics in order to deduce equilibrium prices 
in a formal and empirically testable way. Standard economic theory starts with the 
assumption of means-end rational actors trying to maximize their utility function (that is 
assumed to have certain properties: be stable, given and logically sorted) by orientating 
themselves strictly on market prices. The utility function results from the individuals’ 
structure of preferences that is assumed to have certain properties: to be stable, to be given, 
and to be ranked in a logical order. Assuming perfect competition and complete information, 
market prices are to be interpreted as overall and objectively correct information signaling the 
underlying resource structure and demand structure, and make the market “best practice” of 
socially coordinating individuals’ demand and supply within a given set. 
New Institutionalism in economics as well as in sociology criticizes the ideal-typical model 
of ‘homo oeconomicus’ as well as that of a ‘perfect-competition market’ by arguing that both 
are ‘unrealistic’ and furthermore that in reality every market needs a certain spectrum of 
institutional framework, at the very least property rights and a national state. While New 
Institutionalism in economics almost always focuses on the problem of transaction costs 
going along with incomplete contracts and analyzes social institutions as control 
mechanisms in addition to, or as alternative to, markets.  
To put it more general, economic sociology argues that all market exchange has to deal with 
the problem of uncertainty because of bounded individual rationality as well as social 
complexity that makes any kind of social expectation helpful by framing exchange relations 
and providing either simple orientation or ensuring coordination in the form of social 
exchange (Granovetter, 1985). According to the notion of social expectations developed 
above and in order to strengthen our understanding of social institutions in the economic 
sphere as well as that of markets, we have to give precise arguments as to why and to what 
degree exchange relations – and as a part of these market relations – make social 
expectations helpful and advantageous for individuals and society. According to this, we 
have to show why social institutions may be helpful, possible, and wanted by the 
                                                                 
4 Therefore the “varieties of capitalism” or that of production systems are described as different relation 
patterns between firms and the financial system (Hall & Soskice, 2001) differing in their stability and 
efficiency. 
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individuals when acting in markets (see paragraph 2). The general heuristic is to set the 
main problems apart that go along with exchange and to dissect the underlying problems in 
markets, especially those that make social institutions advantageous in the modern 
economy. This can be done in a problem-oriented way by analyzing basic needs for 
orientation in the sense of what ends and means exist in a market, where markets emerge, 
who the buyers and sellers are in a market, etc. Sociology can consequently discuss why 
cultural symbols, social signals, or tacit knowledge help individuals to act socially in 
markets (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1983; Podolny, 2005; Geertz, 2011). For example, only if 
‘life’, ‘salvation’, ‘love’, etc. are regarded as commodities can we choose to provide or to buy 
a life insurance (Zelizer, 2005), religious salvation and symbols (Wuthnow, 2005), or love, 
and in doing so create stable markets. This is to fill a blank in economic theory by explaining 
individual preferences as a result of social processes (Hirschman, 1977) as well as general 
orientations underlying individuals’ actions as means-end rationality in the sense of utility 
maximization (Weber, 1946). 
In the last three decades, New Economic Sociology has focused on the problem of how to 
guarantee exchange mostly within a group of strangers or at least morally no longer 
integrated people. All the questions of ensuring exchange relations can be discussed as 
forms of coordination problems. These problems have many solutions because there is an 
overall interest in success, but all of these solutions offer a particular benefit that motivates 
the emergence of social institutions in general, some of which being more likely to emerge, 
and provides opportunities for using power and strategy. While the problem of social 
expectations within exchange relations is widely dealt with in economic sociology, 
according to Mark Granovetter (1985) it is mostly discussed under the broad headline of 
uncertainty. But only if we differentiate degrees of difficulty, we can explain what 
institutions might help and come into being.  
More interesting for sociology, although far more difficult, are questions concerning the 
definition of exchange rates (or more widely the question of stratification within a group) 
when there are no market prices (public goods, when markets are too small) or when market 
prices do not work (within families, friendship, democracy) or cannot work (because of 
imperfect competition like within the education system, health care, within an organization, 
etc.). Whenever market prices do not exist or should not work for social reasons in modern 
economy, social expectations must define explicitly the worth of goods and services. In other 
words, the most important aspect in exchange relations, namely what potential producers can 
expect and what consumers have to pay, must be defined either by law or by collective 
decisions or by normative ideas about justice or the like. It is obvious that every social 
definition of exchange rates normally causes conflicts; the greater the differences between the 
members of a society and the looser the ‘social ties’, the bigger the conflicts to be solved and 
the less is rationality of coordination (North, 1977). As Weber stated at the beginning of the 20th 
century, the central mechanism of modern economy is the market price because prices defined 
on large markets make individual rational orientation in the economic sphere (especially profit 
maximization) possible and lead to the highest level of rational production (Weber, 1978).  
c. Social expectations on markets 
As Polanyi and others stated, the modern kind of market economy was established in the 
mid-19th century, and the dominance of market mechanism in modern society was set. With 
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this, we mean that all incomes derive from market activities and almost all goods are prized 
commodities dealt with in markets. As a result, not only the supply and demand of 
consumer goods is organized by markets, but also labor force, money, religious and social 
goods (love, friendship, welfare, and trust) are increasingly prized and exchanged on 
markets. According to the underlying notion of institution, I have to concede that the overall 
functioning of the market mechanism in the modern western world has brought a new level 
of material wealth on the one hand (North, 1990; Goldstone, 2009), but also a dramatic 
change in or loss of social integration on the other (Hirschman, 1986). That means that 
today, modern societies are ruled to a very high degree by the market mechanism and 
therefore are contrasted by the need for social integration, bounding, and legitimation. From 
an institutional point of view we have to take into account that social institutions firstly help 
by defining and enforcing ‘socially defined standards’ that might correct market prices as 
well as market failures. Secondly, social values are also needed for the functioning of 
markets by defining and legitimation individual’s preferences. Both could be seen during 
the recent financial crisis, making clear that markets can fail and sometimes need to be 
framed by social values as well as that there is no easy way to substitute market prices 
because then social exchange must be motivated and enforced by social mechanisms that 
normally provide the basis for power and conflict (Fligstein, 2005; Nee, 2005). Socially 
defined patterns of stratification normally need collective decisions, public legitimation as 
well as conflict regulations, all of which normally go along with a lack of efficiency. 
3.3 Economy from a sociological point of view  
Modern economy is normally thought of as the subject of economic theories, and sociology 
is considered to deal with social aspects. During the greater part of the 20th century, 
sociologists focused on social integration by norms and hierarchies, and economists on 
market coordination on the basis of the model of man as ‘homo oeconomicus’. I wish to 
posit that within an action-based multi-level framework, we can discuss typical situations of 
social action – in a broad sense – which make institutions advantegous. A particular social 
situation is when rational actors pursue their own interests but take others into account. 
According to this, we can provide arguments about why individuals try to establish and 
maintain certain institutions, and we can also analyze the functioning of such institutions 
with regard to the underlying structure.  
This can be done for typical social as well as economic or political institutions. To bring 
social factors back into the analysis of economy, I have suggested elaborating on typical 
social configurations that explain why privately-owned firms as well as large consumer 
markets and market prices have become so important in modern western economies. 
Furthermore, I have discussed what kinds of problems have to be solved when social action 
is taking place within large firms and markets. Concerning this, I have argued that in large 
firms institutions are wanted that allow for efficient coordination and also help to solve 
conflicts that go along with sharing the coordination effects and the central coordination 
structure. I have also illustrated that the spread of the market mechanism can be explained 
as a kind of framing exchange relations in large groups without a moral or normative basis. 
Firms as well as markets can now be explained as institutions established by socially 
interdependent actors who try to coordinate their actions in order to gain economic benefits 
yet also generate further problems and unintended by-products. 
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The integrative perspective of this approach is to elaborate upon variations of the named 
main situations and their underlying problems and to show when institutions are 
established to solve the problem and what social effects these institutions can have. Thus, 
the main thesis is that different kinds of social institutions matter in economic life because 
they provide mutual expectations in general and thereby solve various problems of social 
actions in particular. Mass product markets and privately-owned large firms are seen as a 
result of both the decline of small and morally integrated groups as well as that of formally 
free and rationally acting individuals that try to improve their lives. One major task for 
sociology in the future is to conduct analytical and empirical research on understanding the 
change of social structure brought about by the spread of the named economic institutions. 
In other words, we do not only need more knowledge about the rise of modern western 
economy, but also about the way economy is changing and thereby disabling or enabling 
social institutions.  
4. Conclusion  
One of the mostly discussed problems in sociology is that of bridging individuals and social 
structure and hence taking into account social, cultural, and economic aspects when 
explaining and analyzing society. Because of this the development of multi-level and mostly 
action-based explanations turned out to be one of the most important developments in 
sociology in general and in economic sociology in particular. In this regard, institution 
theories are very helpful because social institutions in a broad sense as socially constituted 
expectations can be explained as a result of individual actions and, in particular, social 
situations. Furthermore, the intended as well as the unintended by-products of such 
institutions can be analyzed according to the underlying problem structure as well as to 
individuals’ capabilities and motivations. On this basis, I have argued that the rise of both 
business firms and mass markets can be explained as attempts of formally free individuals 
to improve their living conditions by the coordination through central hierarchies as well as 
decentralized market exchange, both, however, going along with the need for further 
institutions. While the large firm is predominantly characterized by its conflict structure that 
has to be framed by collective ideas or bargaining mechanisms, markets always need social 
definitions about goods, sellers, and buyers, and most of the time trust-building institutions 
that help running exchange relations by strangers when competition fails or when there is a 
lack of information. Due to the logic of the underlying problem, social institutions like 
cultural symbols, tacit knowledge, networks, or even – in more problematic cases – formal 
rules and hierarchies are helpful in stabilizing or substituting market mechanisms. In doing 
so, we can now not only state that institutions matter in economy, but we can more precisely 
formulate theses about when and why which sorts of institutions might be helpful and also 
possible. That means that the market can no longer be seen as the most effective 
coordination mechanism in economy, but only as one of many that works most efficiently 
when functioning by defining prices that state the resource structure.  
Some additional work has to be done to widen the action theory so that interests as well as 
duties or customs be integrated, in the sense that we can give theoretical arguments about 
economic actions that are interest-based as well as governed by normatively or habitually 
founded institutions. Also, some more work has to be done to pay more attention to specific 
human abilities, especially rationality and creativity, which help to describe problem 
www.intechopen.com
 
Economic Sociology: Bringing Back Social Factors 97 
constellations and to find social solutions. But as I have clearly mentioned above, the main 
sociological task is to explore social interdependencies or situations that cause social 
expectations and provide the opportunity structure to define and maintain them.  
What I intended to do, was to look at economy from a general sociological view and to 
provide a clear thesis about the rise of the two main economic institutions in modern 
economy: the business firm and the mass market. By using the tools of social and 
institutional theory, I argued that under the integrated roof of institution theory we can and 
should explain as well as analyze economic institutions as a form of social-expectation 
building. But in order to overcome the restrictions of classics we have to analyze their 
functioning with regard to individuals and the underlying problem logic of typical social 
constellations. In doing so, we can now state that market mechanisms help to coordinate 
strangers or morally no longer integrated individuals, but only based on socially defined 
preferences, skills, and property rights. Furthermore, we can now argue that most of 
economic life needs at least additional social mechanisms in order to enforce market 
mechanisms and sometimes also to be a proper alternative. This is what economic sociology 
could do in the future, whereas sociology in general could concentrate more on the effects 
economic institutions have on social life by using and destroying traditional social 
institutions like temporal rhythms, family relations, religious rituals, traditional knowledge, 
networks, ethics, etc. This means also considering how firms and market actors can be 
socially included or at least bring social concerns into the economic scene.  
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